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Disasters have been predominantly construed as destructive events causing loss of lives, 
livelihoods and hard-won development. Much less attention has been paid to the constructive 
nature of disasters as creating potential windows of opportunities to address the overlooked 
and neglected aspects of disaster risk reduction. Using material from Zimbabwe, this article 
examines whether the humanitarian crisis, as manifested in the cholera disaster of 2008–2009, 
created a window of opportunity to accelerate the implementation of the Hyogo Framework 
for Action. The indings suggest that the humanitarian crisis did not necessarily create a 
window of opportunity to accelerate the implementation of the framework, owing to (1) 
inadequate authority and power of the agency responsible for disaster risk reduction, (2) an 
inadequate legal and institutional framework that outlines clear coordination, accountability 
mechanisms, resource mobilisation, community participation, and integration of development 
with regard to disaster risk reduction and (3) a lack of an integrated evidence-based approach 
to advocate disaster risk reduction in Zimbabwe.
Introducion
Disasters are predominantly constructed as undesirable, destructive events associated with loss 
of lives, livelihoods and hard-won development. Yet disasters can be constructive. A disaster 
can potentially be a ‘wake-up call’ to warn affected communities to take action concerning the 
overlooked or neglected aspects of disaster risk reduction (DRR). In particular, above-threshold 
or unprecedented disaster events such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 
the US in 2005, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan 
can not only shift perception paradigms but also create ‘windows of opportunity’ (Birkmann 
et al. 2010) to enhance community resilience. 
However, according to Birkmann et al. (2010) there is little empirical evidence to suggest that 
countries, particularly those in the developing world, that have experienced unprecedented 
crises have used such disaster events as ‘windows of opportunity’ to enhance resilience to 
disasters. This is an important gap which needs relection by disaster risk scientists, particularly 
those involved in disciplines associated with disaster research and scholarship. But, how can we 
know whether these above-threshold disaster events have created ‘windows of opportunities’ for 
positive change? One of the ways is to examine whether these events have provided increased 
impetus to the implementation of the global disaster policy, the Hyogo Framework for Action 
(HFA), which was adopted in Japan in 2005.
Zimbabwe, one of the countries that ratiied the HFA, experienced an unprecedented 
humanitarian crisis mainly due to the socio-economic decline during the 2000–2009 decade. One 
of the major negative impacts of the socio-economic decline was the above-threshold 2008–2009 
cholera disaster, which claimed more than 4000 lives (Mason 2009; Sirajuddin et al. 2011). In this 
article the author questions whether the humanitarian crisis provided a ‘window of opportunity’ 
for Zimbabwe to implement the provisions of the HFA to enhance community resilience. To this 
end, the author turned the ive actions of the HFA into the following operational questions:•	 To what extent has DRR been made a national and local priority?•	 To what extent has the identiication, assessment and monitoring of disaster risks and early-
warning systems been enhanced?•	 Has the culture of safety and resilience been enhanced using knowledge, innovation and 
education?•	 What is the level of progress in reducing the underlying risk factors?•	 To what extent has disaster preparedness improved to ensure effective response?
Using the HFA as a tool of analysis is novel and rare but can be justiied in at least two ways. 
Firstly, the HFA is an internationally agreed DRR policy framework aimed at enhancing the 
resilience of nations and communities (Djalante et al. 2012). Secondly, the HFA has increasingly 
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become a useful and overarching normative framework in 
guiding and facilitating comprehensive approaches towards 
DRR policies (Kishore 2011). 
The sections that follow outline the HFA, Zimbabwe’s hazard 
and vulnerability proile and the methodology. The indings 
of the study are presented based on the ive actions of the 
HFA. It is concluded that there is little evidence to suggest 
that the humanitarian crisis, particularly the cholera disaster, 
provided increased impetus to implementing the provisions 
of the HFA in Zimbabwe.
The Hyogo Framework for Acion
The 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) 
held in Kobe, Japan culminated in the HFA and initiated 
a strategic and systematic approach to building disaster 
resilience (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction [UNISDR] 2007:5). The WCDR emerged from a 
complex history of disaster and development connections, 
shifting from the hazard through vulnerability to resilience 
paradigm. In 1987, the United Nations declared the 1990s 
the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR) (Alexander 1991; Lechat 1990). 
The IDNDR debates were dominated by scientiic and 
technological approaches to reducing disaster risks (Hewitt 
1997). In 1994, the mid-term review of the IDNDR was held 
in Yokohama. It was noted at the review that the IDNDR had 
made little impact in reducing disaster risks; in fact, there 
was formal recognition that disasters were ‘embedded in the 
political structures, economic systems and social orders of the 
societies in which they take place’ (Bankoff, Georg & Hilhorst 
2004:35). By the end of the 1990s, social dimensions of DRR 
started taking centre stage. There was increased recognition 
that disasters are a result of the combination of the exposure 
to a hazard, the conditions of vulnerability and insuficient 
resilience to reduce the negative consequences of disasters 
(Blaikie et al. 1994). 
Thus, the HFA builds on the assumption that disasters arise 
when natural hazards interact with socially constructed 
vulnerabilities. These are conditions determined by physical, 
social, economic and environmental factors or processes, 
which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact 
of hazards. Examples of socially constructed vulnerabilities 
include under-development, environmental degradation, 
climate change and preventable epidemics (UNISDR 2005:1) 
such as cholera and typhoid. 
The HFA is also underpinned by the assumption that 
disasters result from a lack of resilience. Here, resilience is 
viewed as: 
[t]he capacity of a system, community or society potentially 
exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order 
to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social 
system is capable of organising itself to increase this capacity for 
learning from past disasters for better future protection and to 
improve risk reduction measures. (UNISDR 2005:4)
Berkes (2007) identiies three reasons why resilience attracts 
increasing attention. Firstly, resilience thinking provides 
not only an all-hazards approach but also a comprehensive 
vulnerability analysis by avoiding artiicial boundaries 
between a physical and a social emphasis. Secondly, 
resilience puts emphasis on the ability of a system to absorb 
disturbances, to learn from it and adapt, or to reorganise 
following the impact. This allows for multiple ways in 
which a response may occur across temporal and spatial 
scales (Berkes 2007; Berkes & Ross 2013). Thirdly, because 
resilience deals with the dynamic response to hazards, it 
is forward looking and helps to explore policy options for 
dealing with uncertainty and change. Resilient systems 
have inbuilt redundancy by having multiple avenues for 
meeting needs or dealing with speciic responses. Although 
they may be eficient, centralised and integrated systems are 
not necessarily resilient compared with decentralised and 
devolved systems, which tend to have inbuilt redundancies. 
Further, a resilient system has a ‘feedback loop’ or pattern 
of interacting processes, where a change in one variable, 
through interaction with other variables in the system, either 
reinforces the original process or suppresses the process 
(Carpenter 2011). The assumption here is that resilience 
provides a lens through which humanity can engage with 
the human–environment systems to ‘live with risk’ and cope 
with change characterised by surprises or unknowable future 
risks (Berkes 2007). 
By focusing on vulnerability and resilience, the HFA shifts the 
cause of disasters from environmental determinism (acts of 
God and Nature) to social construction, where disasters are 
viewed as acts of people (Furedi 2007). From this vantage 
point, disasters are treated less as a pre-given ontological 
category and more as discursive constructions of subjectivities 
that are at least multidimensional, multidisciplinary and 
inherently full of contradictions. Examining the notions of 
disasters as a pre-given category can be somewhat simplistic, 
if not short-sighted. It can produce the assumption that 
disasters constitute an ontological foundation on which 
disaster interventions are predicated. 
The UNISDR, which succeeded the IDNDR in 1999, 
embedded vulnerability and resilience in the HFA. The HFA 
rebranded disaster management, as it was then known, to 
DRR. DRR was deined as:
[t]he concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through 
systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of 
disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, 
lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management 
of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for 
adverse events. (UNISDR 2009:10)
The expected outcome of the HFA during the 2005–2015 
period was a ‘substantial reduction of disaster losses, in 
lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets 
of communities and countries’. It articulates three strategic 
goals. Firstly, the HFA encourages the integration of disaster 
prevention, mitigation, preparedness and vulnerability 
reduction into development programmes. Secondly, the 
HFA considers strong disaster institutions, mechanisms and 
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capacities at all levels, in particular at the community level, 
to systematically contribute to building resilience to hazards. 
Finally, the systematic incorporation of risk reduction 
approaches into emergency preparedness, response and 
recovery programmes can also contribute to DRR. To this 
end, the HFA has ive priority actions. Although there are 
no speciic time-bound targets and benchmarks, each of the 
ive actions has a series of indicators for measuring progress. 
Additional mechanisms for measuring progress include 
platforms at the global, regional and national levels. These 
platforms are the main multisectoral and interdisciplinary 
mechanisms for coordination and policy guidance on DRR 
for public, private and civil society participation that involve 
all concerned entities within a country (UNISDR 2005). 
The context of Zimbabwe’s 
2000–2009 humanitarian crisis 
Zimbabwe is located in southern Africa (Figure 1) and has a 
population of 12 million people. 
During the irst decade of this century, Zimbabwe experienced 
socio-economic decline, which increased its vulnerability 
to disasters. The contributors to the decline included 
strained relations with some members of the international 
community, reduced aid inlows, and economic and other 
policy implementation constraints. The decline manifested 
in hyper-inlationary pressures, high unemployment (70%) 
and shortages of basic goods and foreign currency. This 
situation was exacerbated by the HIV and AIDS pandemic 
and loss of skilled labour to the diaspora. The socio-economic 
decline has weakened the support for crucial social services 
such as health and education. As a result, social indicators 
also declined dramatically. In 2011, Zimbabwe’s Human 
Development Index was 0.376, below sub-Saharan Africa’s 
regional average of 0.463 (United Nations Development 
Programme [UNDP] 2011). Similarly, the life expectancy 
declined from a peak of 61.5 years in 1986 to 35 years in 2006, 
although it rose again to 51.4 years in 2011. It is estimated 
that half the population survive on less than $1 a day (UNDP 
2011). In these circumstances, Zimbabwe’s vulnerability to 
disasters has increased.
During the irst decade of independence from Britain in 1980, 
Zimbabwe made remarkable progress towards achieving 
socio-economic development goals. Agriculture production 
from commercial and peasant farmers lourished, social 
indicators improved owing to improvements in social 
services and industry boomed. On the political front, a policy 
of reconciliation between Black people and White people 
appeared to be working. Also, the two main political parties, 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU 
PF) and Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African People’s Unions 
(PF-ZAPU), amalgamated into Zimbabwe African National 
Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU [PF]).
However, by the early 1990s, Zimbabwe’s economy started to 
decline owing to (1) the adoption of the economic structural 
adjustment programme, which failed to reverse the economic 
decline, (2) the costly but long-neglected payout to war 
veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, (3) corruption 
by ZANU (PF) elites and (4) Zimbabwe’s involvement in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kriger 2007:70). The 
increasing economic hardships gave rise to the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) as an alternative to ZANU 
(PF). The waning support for ZANU (PF) became evident in 
2000 when it lost the constitution referendum. Despite the 
formation of a coalition government consisting of ZANU (PF) 
and the MDC in 2009, the economy had virtually collapsed 
owing to political turmoil and inighting. 
Although the coalition government was unstable because the 
political leaders had not adhered to the text and spirit of the 
government of national unity (Newsday 14 August 2011), the 
crisis provided opportunities to improve socio-economic and 
political stability, for example, through (1) a medium-term 
plan that set national priorities for the period 2010–2015 to 
foster economic growth, global competitiveness, jobs, equity, 
freedom and democracy and (2) the new constitution. Whilst 
the socio-economic decline increased vulnerability and 
reduced the resilience to disasters, did it provide a window 
of opportunity to improve DRR policies and programmes? 
Zimbabwe is generally a medium- to low-disaster risk 
country, mostly affected by slow-onset disasters that are 
triggered by hydro-meteorological hazards such as droughts, 
cyclones and loods. Droughts, which are linked to the warm 
El Niño Southern Oscillation in the Paciic Ocean, tend to 
pose the greatest challenge to Zimbabwe’s agriculture-
based economy (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Diseases [CRED] 2012). Droughts have led to crop shortfalls, 
livestock decimation, water shortage and economic losses. 
The worst droughts were recorded in 1946–1947 and 1991–
1992, when rainfall during the agricultural season averaged 
365 mm and 315 mm, respectively. In 1992, the government 
spent $8 million – $10 million a month on drought relief 
(Government of Zimbabwe 2008; Savage 2011). Floods have 
also been common in Zimbabwe over the last century and 
Source: Author (with assistance from Jon Swords)
FIGURE 1: Relaive regional locaion of Zimbabwe and its provinces.
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have broadly been associated with climate change (Eriksen, 
O’Brien & Rosentrater 2007). The cyclone Eline-induced 
loods in the Zambezi Basin in 2000 claimed 90 lives, left 
more than 100 000 people homeless and resulted in more 
than $3 million of infrastructural damage. 
Technological disasters, particularly those involving public 
transport, have also escalated. Although the number of 
accidents decreased from a peak of 60 360 in 2002 to 16 904 
in 2008, there has been a steady increase in accidents since 
2009 (from 20 553 to 31 566 in 2011). Road trafic accidents 
are likely to continue to rise owing to the increase in vehicles, 
deteriorating road infrastructure and limited capacity to 
enforce road trafic regulations.
Nonetheless, disasters triggered by the hydro-meteorological 
and technological hazards that occurred during the 2000–2009 
decade generally either fell within the threshold levels or 
could be responded to with available capacity. In relation to 
biological hazards, the cholera outbreak in 2008 proved to be 
the largest in Zimbabwe’s history: over 98 000 cases and more 
than 4000 deaths were recorded (Mason 2009; Mukandavire 
et al. 2011). Mason (2009) attributes the cholera outbreak 
to the breakdown in water supply, sanitation and hygiene 
facilities, breakdown in health services, a lack of diagnostic 
services and failure of primary health care systems. The 
irst cholera case, clinically diagnosed as Vibrio cholera, was 
reported on 20 August 2008 in Chitungwiza (Mason 2009), 
a large urban centre on the outskirts of Harare. The cholera 
outbreak quickly spread to most parts of Zimbabwe. By 
November 2008, large outbreaks were recorded in Beitbridge 
on the border with South Africa. By December 2008, cholera 
outbreaks were reported in all 10 provinces of Zimbabwe. 
Mason (2009) suspects that cholera outbreaks could also 
have spread to neighbouring countries, namely South Africa, 
Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. However, it was 
not until 03 December 2008 that the cholera outbreak was 
declared a state of emergency to allow for the mobilisation 
of international humanitarian aid. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) then set up a Cholera Command and 
Control Centre in Harare to coordinate international groups 
to distribute medication and help with the country’s water 
treatment (Mukandavire et al. 2011). 
The decentralised cholera risk reduction campaign was 
headed by the Department of Civil Protection (the national 
DRR agency) at national level, the provincial governors 
at provincial level, the district administrators at district 
level, and ward health workers at ward level (WHO 2009). 
In the cholera risk reduction campaign, the Department 
of Civil Protection was guided by the Civil Protection 
Act of 1989 (Government of Zimbabwe 1989). The Act 
provides a framework for DRR in Zimbabwe, including 
resource mobilisation, administration and implementation 
mechanisms. The Department of Civil Protection worked 
with the structures provided in the Civil Protection Act. At 
national level, the department coordinated the cholera risk 
reduction campaign through the National Civil Protection 
Committee, which also served as the National Platform. At 
the sub-national level, coordination was effected through 
planning committees for ‘civil protection provinces’ or 
‘civil protection areas’, comprising technical persons from 
government ministries, local authorities, statutory bodies 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
The civil protection committees meet once every month under 
normal circumstances. However, when a disaster occurs, 
meetings become more frequent until the disaster has been 
managed. In many ways, the cholera risk reduction campaign 
could have provided an impetus for the Department of 
Civil Protection to implement the provisions of the HFA to 
enhance community resilience to disasters. 
Methodology
To establish whether the unprecedented cholera outbreak 
in Zimbabwe provided a ‘window of opportunity’ to 
implement the provisions of the HFA, both quantitative and 
qualitative data sources were used. Participants comprised 
civil protection committee members drawn from United 
Nations (UN) agencies, NGOs, local authorities and research 
institutions. A total of 161 participants, spread across the 
national, provincial (3), rural districts’ (4) and urban councils’ 
(3) civil protection committees completed a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was adapted from the HFA indicators, 
with participants asked to rate the HFA progress as low, 
medium or high (Table 1). 
Before participants completed the questionnaire, the 
researcher explained the HFA background, the goals 
and objectives, the priority actions and the indicators for 
each of the actions. This provided participants with basic 
information to help them to engage meaningfully with the 
questionnaire. Subsequently, on the basis of the ratings on 
the questionnaire, participants were asked to write notes on 
issues they considered to be critical for achieving the HFA’s 
goals in Zimbabwe. The issues were grouped into themes 
that broadly relected the HFA’s priorities and actions. New 
issues that emerged from the discussion were also noted. 
Findings and discussion on 
Zimbabwe’s progress in 
implemening the Hyogo 
Framework for Acion
This section presents the indings from the questionnaire 
and group discussions using the HFA’s ive priority actions 
and the outcome indicators.
TABLE 1: Criteria for raing the use of the indicators of the Hyogo Framework for 
Acion in Zimbabwe.
Raing Descripion
Low Minor or relaively small and incomplete achievements; commitment 
and capacity limited
Medium There is insituional commitment and capacity, but progress is not 
substanial
High Comprehensive or substanial achievements, with commitment or 
capacity to sustain eforts
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Hyogo Framework for Acion 1: Ensure that 
disaster risk reducion is a naional and local 
priority with a strong insituional basis for 
implementaion
The assumption of HFA1 is that strong institutional and 
legal frameworks, availability of resources, enhanced 
community participation and a functional national platform 
are basic elements for building resilience to disasters. 
HFA1 has four outcome indicators (HFA1.1–1.4) (UNISDR 
2008). In relation to HFA1.1, institutional and legal policy 
framework and capacities should exist for DRR at all levels 
by 2015. This means that Zimbabwe’s constitution, legal 
and policy frameworks, and government systems should 
provide the basis to develop plans and organisational 
arrangements for all areas of DRR in Zimbabwe. To achieve 
HFA1.2, the government of Zimbabwe would need to make 
resources available for DRR planning and implementation. 
Dedicated DRR resources should be included in the 
government’s budget for the coordinating agency as well 
as sector ministries and departments. According to HFA1.3, 
community participation in DRR should be promoted by 2015 
through, amongst others, networks and volunteers. Local 
communities will have delegated authority and resources 
to plan and implement DRR activities. Finally, a functional 
multisectoral platform should be established (HFA1.4). 
The national platform as a coordination mechanism should 
engage stakeholders from government, the United Nations, 
NGOs, the private sector and vulnerable groups such as 
women and children to discuss and share information and 
develop consensus on DRR. 
Table 2 summarises the responses to HFA1. The majority 
(55%) of participants rated the general progress towards 
making DRR a national and local priority as low. About 37% 
and 8% rated the progress as medium and high, respectively. 
More than two-thirds of the participants attributed lack 
of progress in achieving HFA1 to inadequate resources 
dedicated to DRR at national, provincial and local authority 
levels. Interviews with participants across the country 
conirmed that inancial, human and material resources were 
inadequate. At the national level, although the Department 
of Civil Protection had a small budget for emergencies, 
there was hardly any budget allocated for emergencies at 
the provincial and local authority levels. When a localised 
disaster event occurs, sub-national structures often wait for 
the release of funds from the Department of Civil Protection’s 
budget. During the 2008 cholera outbreak, the international 
agencies, particularly the United Nations agencies such 
as the United Nations Children Fund and WHO provided 
the bulk of the resources. In addition, there was hardly any 
budget for recovery. 
Through observation by the researcher and interviews 
with civil protection committees, it was established that the 
structures destroyed by cyclone Eline in 2000, particularly 
the bridges, were yet to be rehabilitated. As a consequence 
of limited budgetary allocations, DRR in Zimbabwe 
is characterised by limited human resource capacity, 
inadequate materials and equipment, including transport, 
chemicals and vaccines for prevention of animal and crop 
diseases. However, participants noted that a lack of funds 
for DRR was not necessarily evidence of a lack of political 
will. In contrast, there were two major challenges, namely 
(1) lack of knowledge and understanding amongst decision-
makers regarding what DRR entails, including the HFA and 
(2) inadequate evidence to justify increasing the DRR budget 
to the Department of Civil Protection and across ministries. 
It might then be inferred that the key reasons for the lack of 
adequate resources can be attributed to underlying factors, 
primarily limited awareness and evidence-based approaches 
to advocate DRR amongst policymakers. 
In addition to inadequate resources, about two-thirds of 
participants cited a lack of community participation at the 
local levels as a contributing factor to fully implementing 
HFA1. Interviews with participants highlighted that there 
was a disconnect between national and sub-national levels. 
The framework provided by the 1989 Civil Protection Act was 
inadequate, not only in guiding community participation 
but also with regard to accountability mechanisms. There 
were four major dificulties identiied by participants: 
inadequate power and authority by the Department of Civil 
Protection, ineffective sub-national structures, response 
mode and centralisation. Firstly, as a department within 
a ministry of local government (rather than being under 
the stronger and politically powerful ofices such as the 
president’s or prime minister’s ofice), the Department 
of Civil Protection has inadequate power and authority. 
This is in contrast with the study by the Commission for 
Africa, UNISDR and World Bank (2008), which found that 
countries such as Kenya, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Nigeria, Seychelles, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia had the 
DRR ofice located in the president’s or prime minister’s 
ofice for easier coordination across ministries and agencies. 
Secondly, the sub-national structures have generally been 
TABLE 2: Percepions of respondents with regard to achieving Hyogo Framework for Acion 1: Making disaster risk reducion a naional and local priority.
Indicator code Descripion Raing (%)
L M H
HFA1.1 Naional insituional and legal frameworks for DRR exist, with decentralised responsibiliies and capaciies at all levels 44 46 10 
HFA1.2 Dedicated and adequate resources are available to implement DRR plans at all administraive levels 77 22 1
HFA1.3 Community paricipaion and decentralisaion are ensured through the delegaion of authority and resources to local levels 60 32 8
HFA1.4 A naional mulisectoral plaform for DRR is funcioning 34 50 16
Overall raing - 55 37 8
n = 161.
The overall raing is the average of the raings of each of the columns.
HFA, Hyogo Framework for Acion; DRR, disaster risk reducion; H, high; L, low; M, medium. 
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ineffective because the Civil Protection Act does not provide 
for the speciic designated functions, inancial and material 
resources at both the provincial and local authority levels. 
Thirdly, without resources for disaster prevention and 
preparedness, Zimbabwe’s disaster management remains 
in the response mode rather than focusing on vulnerability 
and resilience. Finally, whilst in theory DRR is decentralised 
in Zimbabwe, it is actually centralised, with a technical bias. 
The Department of Civil Protection makes decisions on even 
small localised disaster events. Yet since the promulgation of 
the Civil Protection Act in 1989, the global context for DRR has 
drastically advanced from the hazard paradigm, through the 
vulnerability paradigm, to the resilience paradigm. 
Nonetheless, HFA1 indicators also recorded some progress. 
About half of the participants rated the progress in national 
institutional and legal frameworks as ‘medium’ (HFA1.1). 
The Disaster Risk Management Bill and the Disaster Risk 
Management Policy, whose process was initiated as early 
as 2005, were being inalised by authorities almost a decade 
later. The Draft Disaster Risk Management framework will 
replace the Civil Protection Act, which will reform the Disaster 
Risk Management institutional framework in Zimbabwe. In 
these policy documents, there are three key features that 
make them relatively compliant with the HFA. Firstly, there 
is a notable shift in rhetoric from emergency preparedness 
and response to integrated disaster risk management 
that focuses on preventing and mitigating the severity of 
disasters, emergency preparedness, response and recovery. 
Secondly, there is also a decentralised framework with 
enhanced clarity of roles and responsibilities at national and 
sub-national levels. Increased emphasis has been placed on 
community-based DRR, not only to foster the participation 
of threatened communities in the evaluation of risk and ways 
to reduce it but also to ensure application and adaptation of 
local indigenous risk-coping knowledge and practices into 
risk reduction strategies (Annelies 2009; Kale 2010; Maceda 
et al. 2009). Finally, the proposed legal frameworks outline the 
funding mechanisms for prevention, response and recovery. 
A minimum of 1% of the national and local authority 
budgets is set to be allocated to the Disaster Management 
Fund. This resonates with Norris et al. (2008), who argue that 
communities must develop economic resources, reduce risk 
and resource inequities, and attend to their areas of greatest 
social vulnerability to increase their resilience to disasters. 
Half the participants stated that a national multisectoral 
National Civil Protection Committee, which also doubles 
as the DRR platform, was functional (HFA1.4). The national 
platform, which draws members from across sectors, meet 
bimonthly. This has become an important coordinating 
mechanism for mainstreaming DRR into development 
policies, planning and programmes. However, the minimum 
effectiveness of the national platform depends on resource 
availability and the capacity of the sub-national structures 
where disasters happen. This would suggest that the 
structural and systemic challenges may be amongst the 
critical elements that need to be addressed in Zimbabwe in 
order to build disaster resilience.
Hyogo Framework for Acion 2: Improving risk 
informaion and early warning
The HFA assumes that identiication, assessment and 
monitoring of disaster risks and enhanced early-warning 
systems are key elements of resilience building. If the 
four outcome indicators for HFA2 are achieved by 2015, 
Zimbabwe would have implemented: •	 HFA2.1 – a robust system for risk identiication and 
assessment for hazards and vulnerabilities, which 
would inform not only decision-making but also local 
communities about the action to take to reduce the risk•	 HFA2.2 – systems for monitoring, archiving and 
disseminating data in an appropriate and timely manner 
on key hazards and vulnerabilities to allow communities 
to take appropriate action•	 HFA2.3 – an early-warning system for all major hazards, 
with outreach to the communities including the 
assessment of risk knowledge, monitoring and warning 
services, dissemination and communication and response 
capabilities•	 HFA2.4 – a system that places national and local risk 
assessments within the trans-boundary, regional and 
international contexts. 
Drawing from several case studies, including the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident that occurred in the Ukraine (formerly 
part of the Russian Federation) in 1986, Linnerooth-Bayer, 
Loefstedt and Sjoestedt (2000) warn that trans-boundary 
risks can enhance historical tensions and therefore destabilise 
international and regional efforts for cooperation.
 
Table 3 shows that about half of the participants rated the 
progress towards achieving HFA2 as ‘medium’. In contrast, 
43% and 9% of the participants rated the HFA2 progress as 
‘low’ and ‘high’, respectively. 
TABLE 3: Percepions of respondents with regard to achieving Hyogo Framework for Acion 2: Improving risk informaion and early warning.
Indicator code Descripion Raing (%)
L M H
HFA2.1 Naional and local risk assessments based on hazard data and vulnerability informaion are available and include risk assessments 
for key sectors
39 50 11 
HFA2.2 Systems are in place to monitor, archive and disseminate data on key hazards and vulnerabiliies 42 50 8
HFA2.3 Early-warning systems are in place for all major hazards, with outreach to communiies 43 48 9 
HFA2.4 Naional and local risk assessments take account of regional or trans-boundary risks, with a view to regional cooperaion for risk 
reducion
49 42 9
Overall raing - 43 48 9
n = 161.
The overall raing is the average of the raings of each of the columns.
HFA, Hyogo Framework for Acion; H, high; L, low; M, medium. 
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Of the four indicators of HFA2, three received ratings 
around 50% (see HFA2.1–2.3), suggesting that hazard and 
vulnerability analysis and early-warning systems for major 
hazards were in place. This was supported by interviews 
with participants, who stated that hazard and vulnerability 
analysis and early-warning systems were in place for 
droughts, loods and cyclones. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability 
Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC), which falls under 
the Food and Nutrition Council, is the most prominent 
institutionalised approach to risk assessments. Established 
in 2001, ZIMVAC is a multi-agency committee, comprising 
government ministries, United Nations agencies and NGOs, 
which serves both as an early-warning system and the basis 
for interventions. The only dificulty is that ZIMVAC data 
lack clear linkages with the hazard and vulnerability data 
from other government agencies such as the Meteorological 
Services Department, the Environmental Management 
Agency and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority. 
However, about 42% of respondents rated both HFA2.2 
and HFA2.3 as low. From the author’s experience and from 
interviews with participants, particularly at the national 
level, it is clear that even if Zimbabwe had relatively strong 
hazard and vulnerability data, such information would be 
dificult to access. Accessing hazard and vulnerability data 
involves approaching organisations individually rather 
than via a coordinating authority such as the Department of 
Civil Protection. This trend is the same at the sub-national 
levels. This is consistent with a study by Djalante et al. 
(2012) regarding the progress of implementing the HFA in 
Indonesia:
Despite the existence of these data, our experience was that they 
are dificult to locate and obtain … the research conducted by 
each of these organisations are rarely disseminated in the form 
of research reports … to obtain information on the types of data 
and their availability, one needs to approach each organisation 
individually. Moreover, all of these organisations are at the 
national level. It is even more dificult to obtain hazard and risk 
data at the local level. (p. 790)
With regard to HFA2.2, interviews established that there was 
potential to improve the coherence of the information system 
by integrating disparate databases into a single framework 
for easy access by end-users at all levels, particularly for 
decision-making purposes. In other words, Zimbabwe could 
beneit from a multihazard system by focusing on logical 
linkages such as shared observation systems for certain 
hazards and multihazard public education campaigns 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies [IFRC] 2009). To the extent that this may be true, 
early warning is a system and not a technology (IFRC 2009). 
Participants noted that Zimbabwe paid more attention 
to technical aspects of the early-warning systems than 
community-based early-warning systems, which would 
integrate indigenous knowledge systems to prompt early 
action to save lives and livelihoods. 
In relation to trans-boundary risks, about half of the 
participants stated that these were amongst the major 
challenges (HFA2.4). The low rating for trans-boundary risk 
management raises questions over the Southern African 
Development Community’s (SADC) strategies in increasing 
the regional cooperation in building resilience at the regional 
level. However, SADC has started taking some steps to address 
trans-boundary risks. The Zambezi River Basin Initiative 
is one such example, looking to build resilience amongst 
communities from seven countries (Angola, Botswana, 
Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique) 
along the Zambezi River (IFRC n.d.). However, participants 
highlighted particular concerns for the high technological 
and epidemic disease risks posed at ports of entry such as 
Beitbridge, Chirundu and Victoria Falls. Without addressing 
trans-boundary risks, resilience of nations and communities 
to disasters cannot be guaranteed, as disasters can be region 
wide or can spread from one country to another. 
Hyogo Framework for Acion 3: Use knowledge, 
innovaion and educaion to build resilience
According to HFA3, knowledge, education, research 
and public awareness about disasters are assumed to be 
amongst the key elements for building a culture of safety 
and community resilience. HFA3 has four indicators. The 
achievement of HFA3 by 2015 would mean that Zimbabwe 
has implemented: •	 HFA3.1 – relevant information on disasters is available, 
accessible and understandable at all levels, including 
protection options for citizens in high-risk areas •	 HFA3.2 – DRR is incorporated in the primary, secondary 
and tertiary education curricula, underpinned by an 
assumption that children tend to be effective agents for 
building resilience (Izadkhah & Hosseini 2005) •	 HFA3.3 – research systems and tools are in place for 
multirisk assessments and cost–beneit analysis, which 
are underpinned by technical, scientiic and robust 
methodologies for assessing hazards and vulnerabilities •	 HFA3.4 – a strategy for country-wide public awareness 
has been developed, not only to stimulate a culture of 
resilience but also to serve as a basis for advocacy and 
inluencing political commitment to DRR. 
As shown in Table 4, respondents placed the progress 
towards achieving HFA3 predominantly in the ‘low’ category 
(56%). The ‘medium’ and ‘high’ categories scored 38% and 
6%, respectively. 
About two-thirds of the participants stated that there is 
limited systematic inclusion of DRR in the school curriculum 
(HFA3.2). This was rather surprising, as the Department of 
Civil Protection, together with the Ministry of Education’s 
Curriculum Development Unit, United Nations agencies 
and NGOs, had produced educational materials, including 
teachers’ resource books, on DRR. However, the low 
rating may suggest challenges in vertical and horizontal 
information dissemination within and between national 
and sub-national civil protection committees. This could 
also suggest that disaster education amongst policymakers, 
writers and publishers could generally be low, making it 
dificult to integrate DRR into the education curriculum.
Similarly, limited disaster research was amongst the 
contributing factors to little progress in achieving HFA3.3. 
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Disaster research was rated as low, which implies that there 
is a lack of research-based evidence to enable policymakers 
and practitioners to relect on their practices, as well as using 
evidence in advocacy activities. Yet, there are several research 
institutions that have a remit that relate to DRR. These include 
the Scientiic and Industrial Research and Development 
Centre, the Food and Nutrition Council and the University 
of Zimbabwe. The problem may not necessarily be related to 
a lack of research institutions, but rather that the individual 
research institutions have built some comfort zones and 
would feel threatened working with other institutions. For 
example, those working on climate change and on DRR 
rarely exchange data. This suggests a need for the leadership 
to bring disparate research groups together, particularly in 
strategising research focus and the dissemination of outputs.
With regard to HFA3.4, there was an almost even split between 
respondents who rated this indicator as ‘low’ and ‘medium’. 
This could suggest that there was a slight shift towards the 
‘medium’ category. Results from the interviews indicate 
that there was notable progress in raising public awareness 
of disaster risk, particularly through the Department of 
Civil Protection, the Trafic Safety Council of Zimbabwe, 
the Ministry of Health, the Environmental Management 
Agency, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority and the 
Zimbabwe Republic Police, which disseminated early-
warning information through electronic and print media and 
community and school outreach programmes. There were 
also efforts to translate information into local languages, 
including minority languages such as Kalanga, Nambia, 
Tonga and Venda. However, these efforts tended to be 
concentrated at the national level. Efforts to use social media, 
mobile phone technology and the internet to raise disaster 
awareness were still in their infancy. An evidence-based 
strategy for raising awareness might be needed to enhance 
resilience in Zimbabwe. 
Hyogo Framework for Acion 4: Reduce the 
underlying risk factors 
Reducing underlying risks through environmental, social 
and economic policies and plans are amongst the key 
elements of building disaster resilient communities (HFA4). 
HFA4 has six output indicators. If Zimbabwe were to achieve 
HFA4 by 2015, it would mean that the following have been 
implemented:•	 HFA4.1 – DRR incorporated into environmental 
policies and plans, including land use, natural resource 
management and climate change adaptation 
•	 HFA4.2 – social development plans and policies that 
focus on reducing vulnerability to aspects such as food 
insecurity, public health, risk sharing and critical public 
infrastructure •	 HFA4.3 – economic and sectoral policies and plans such 
as business continuity and recovery planning that reduce 
economic vulnerability •	 HFA4.4 – DRR incorporated into planning and 
management of settlements, including enforcement of 
building codes•	 HFA4.5 – DRR incorporated into post-disaster recovery 
and rehabilitation plans •	 HFA4.6 – procedures for disaster risk assessments for 
major development projects are in place, including 
community involvement in all essential aspects of school 
and health facilities. 
Progress in implementing HFA4 was generally rated as 
‘medium’ (Table 5). However, there seemed to be a minor 
difference (2%) between the two categories, suggesting 
a transition from the ‘low’ to the ‘medium’ category. 
The progress of HFA4 is attributed to the existence of 
environmental (HFA4.1) and social development policies 
(HFA4.2). In particular, the majority of participants were 
of the opinion that Zimbabwe’s environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) policy of 1994 implicitly incorporated 
DRR measures. However, consistent with the literature, 
participants noted limited enforcement of the EIA policy. 
One of the major reasons for limited enforcement of the EIA 
policy appears to be that the policy is seriously fragmented 
owing to its 18 statutes and eight ministries having a bearing 
on the policy (Chinamora 1995). Further, the EIA policy 
was used on an ad hoc and voluntary basis as there was no 
coercive law to enforce it (Chinamora 1995). 
Similarly, a lack of a comprehensive social policy linking 
DRR, recovery and development (HFA4.5) posed a major 
obstacle towards achieving HFA4. Social development 
policies that do not embed DRR may unconsciously increase 
vulnerability to disasters instead of reducing it. Participants 
were also of the opinion that DRR was not mainstreamed into 
recovery. This suggests that there was a disconnect between 
relief, rehabilitation and development, which implies that 
opportunities created by the disaster to ‘build back better’ 
could have been lost. However, the humanitarian situation 
that prevailed in Zimbabwe during the irst decade of this 
century provided an opportunity to revisit policies or develop 
new ones that would incorporate DRR to some extent. 
Examples include the Food and Nutrition Security and the 
TABLE 4: Percepions of respondents with regard to achieving Hyogo Framework for Acion 3: Use knowledge, innovaion and educaion to build resilience.
Indicator code Descripion Raing (%)
L M H
HFA3.1 Relevant informaion on disasters is available and accessible at all levels, to all stakeholders (through networks and development 
of an informaion sharing system)
53 37 10 
HFA3.2 School curricula, educaional material and relevant training include risk reducion and recovery concepts and pracices 63 34 3
HFA3.3 Research methods and tools for mulirisk assessments and cost–beneit analysis are developed and strengthened 64 33 3 
HFA3.4 Country-wide public awareness strategy exists to simulate a culture of disaster resilience, with outreach to urban and rural 
communiies
47 45 8
Overall raing - 56 38 6
n = 161.
The overall raing is the average of the raings of each of the columns.
HFA, Hyogo Framework for Acion; H, high; L, low; M, medium. 
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Social Protection policies that were being drafted at the time 
of this study. These policies would in many ways address 
the link between relief, rehabilitation and development, 
particularly through cash transfers and productive safety 
nets. In particular, these policies would not only address 
the widespread poverty in disaster-prone marginal areas 
such as Binga in the Zambezi Valley and Beitbridge in the 
Matabeleland South province but also improve safety for 
vulnerable groups such as the elderly and those suffering 
from HIV and AIDS. 
Hyogo Framework for Acion 5: Strengthen 
disaster preparedness for efecive response at 
all levels
Strengthening disaster preparedness and contingency 
planning policies, availability of inancial reserves and 
mechanisms for information exchange and coordination 
are some of the critical elements for enhancing community 
resilience. HFA5 has four outcome indicators. If Zimbabwe 
were to achieve HFA5 the following would have to be 
implemented: •	 HFA5.1 – DRR mainstreamed into disaster preparedness 
and response through enhanced policy, technical and 
institutional capacities and mechanisms •	 HFA5.2 – disaster preparedness and contingency plans in 
place at all administrative levels •	 HFA5.3 – contingency plans that are underpinned by 
regular testing, drills and rehearsals to validate the plans, 
and inancial reserves and contingency mechanisms in 
place to support effective response and recovery •	 HFA5.4 – procedures in place to exchange relevant 
information during and after disaster events. 
HFA5 was generally rated as low, with more than half of 
the participants stating that Zimbabwe had made relatively 
minor progress (Table 6). About 36% and 7% of the 
participants rated progress towards HFA5 in the ‘medium’ 
and ‘high’ categories, respectively. In particular, participants 
were of the opinion that there was a lack of technical and 
institutional capacity at all levels to develop, validate and 
implement preparedness and contingency plans. Although 
participants referred to a preparedness plan coordinated by 
the Department of Civil Protection, it was unclear whether 
such a plan existed; with the exception of the contingency 
plan developed and coordinated by United Nations Ofice 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
such a plan was dificult to obtain. Thus, the UNOCHA 
contingency plan served mainly the UN clusters such as 
agriculture, health, education, nutrition, protection, and 
water, sanitation and hygiene. 
However, even without disaster contingency plans, regular 
simulation exercises were coordinated by the Department 
of Civil Protection to test the level of preparedness. For 
example, exercises were carried out to test the preparedness 
in the event of the wall of the Kariba Dam collapsing. Also, 
the Grain Marketing Board, which has been decentralised 
to rural districts, often maintains strategic grain reserves 
in anticipation of food shortages, particularly following 
droughts. However, drawing from the 2008 cholera outbreak, 
some urban and rural district councils (including the 
Kadoma Municipality and the Chipinge and Chiredzi rural 
district councils) developed some contingency plans. Whilst 
this might suggest a shift towards strengthening contingency 
plans at sub-national level, the shift is likely to be incomplete 
unless local communities take a leading role in developing 
and implementing the plans. 
A lack of inancial reserves or disaster funds was also a 
major obstacle in improving the technical and institutional 
capacity with regard to emergency preparedness and 
response. As already stated under HFA1, it is hoped that the 
proposed Disaster Management Fund will strengthen the 
capacity of government to implement DRR programmes to 
enhance community resilience in Zimbabwe. 
Conclusion
This article has examined whether the humanitarian 
crisis, particularly the recent cholera disaster, provided an 
opportunity for Zimbabwe to accelerate the implementation 
of the HFA. Notwithstanding the disaster rhetoric such as 
DRR, vulnerability and resilience, the indings suggest that 
the progress in implementing the priorities of the HFA was 
generally rated as low. This could be attributed mainly to 
three overriding challenges. Firstly, there is inadequate 
allocation of human, material and inancial resources to 
prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover 
from disasters. Secondly, there is no legal or institutional 
framework for DRR that outlines clear coordination, 
accountability mechanisms, community participation and 
integration of development. Thirdly, a lack of resources or 
slow adoption of disaster policy frameworks indicates either 
limited  political will or a lack of data. 
The fragmented rather than integrated information 
management system is one of the major obstacles to an 
TABLE 5: Percepions of respondents with regard to achieving Hyogo Framework for Acion 4: Reduce the underlying risk factors.
Indicator code Descripion Raing (%)
L M H
HFA4.1 DRR is an integral objecive of environment-related policies and plans, including for land use, natural resource management and 
climate change adaptaion
37 51 12 
HFA4.2 Social development policies and plans are being implemented to reduce the vulnerability of populaions that are most at risk 31 59 10
HFA4.3 Economic and producive sectoral policies and plans have been implemented to reduce the vulnerability of economic aciviies 55 42 3 
HFA4.4 Planning and management of human setlements incorporate DRR elements, including enforcement of building codes 46 48 6
HFA4.5 DRR measures are integrated into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitaion processes 54 40 6
HFA4.6 Procedures are in place to assess disaster risk impacts of all major development projects, especially infrastructure 46 45 8
Overall raing - 45 47 8
n = 161.
The overall raing is the average of the raings of each of the columns.
HFA, Hyogo Framework for Acion; DRR, disaster risk reducion; H, high; L, low; M, medium. 
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evidence-based approach to advocating DRR in Zimbabwe. 
In a nutshell, the humanitarian crisis, particularly the cholera 
disaster, presented missed opportunities to use the HFA as a 
justiication not only to address these confounding challenges 
but also to engender a shift from the costly response mode to 
the low-cost prevention mode. 
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